Abstract: Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) scheme is a method to periodically renew n secret shares in a (k, n) threshold-based Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) without modifying the secret, or reconstructing the secret to reproduce new shares. Traditionally, PSS schemes are developed for the Shamir's SSS which is a single SSS. Bai (2006) developed a multiple-secret sharing scheme using matrix projection. This paper presents a distributed PSS method for the matrix projection SSS. Once the new shares are updated, adversaries cannot discover the secrets from k shares which are mixed with past and present shares. 
Introduction
Secret sharing is an effective way to distribute a secret among n parties, where each party holds one piece of the secret. Blakley (1979) and Shamir (1979) were credited for two initial designs of SSS in 1979 independently. Blakley's method regards a secret as a point in the k-dimensional hyperplane space. These n shares are constructed as k affine hyperplanes in this space. The solution of any k affine hyperplanes is the intersection point (or the secret). This scheme is not a perfect SSS because a person with a share knows that the secret is a point on the hyperplane (the share). In contrast, Shamir proposed a polynomial interpolation method, which satisfied two basic conditional information entropy requirements Karnin et al. (1983) in a perfect SSS. As a result, other secret sharing techniques were based on the Shamir SSS, including many techniques (Okada and Kurosawa, 2000; Beimel and Chor, 1998; Stinson, 1994) to show how the secret shares are authenticated. To avoid a share dealer distributing invalid secret shares (Feldman, 1987) and (Pedersen, 1991) proposed two Copyright © 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. different non-interactive Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) schemes respectively. Since shareholders could also be blamed for wrong shares, they need to authenticate the shares when they receive the shares from the dealer. If shareholders cannot validate the secret shares with the dealer's multicast messages, they multicast an alert message that they have the wrong shares. However, the corrupt shareholders can purposely send out fake alert messages each time when the dealer distributes authenticated secret shares. Consequently, the interactive VSS schemes (Goldreich et al., 1987; Ben-Or et al., 1988) were proposed to detect who are the honest participants and who are the adversaries in the system. Interestingly, a secret sharing system is still quite vulnerable (Herzberg et al., 1995) when a dynamic adversary determines to break into the system before the lifetime of the secret expires. Ben-Or et al. (1988) discussed a general theory for the distributed fault tolerance systems and presented some possible solutions to avoid such attacks. Among many different classifications of adversary attacks, one of the most notable ones is to classify the attacks as:
• passive adversary attacks
• active adversary attacks.
Where passive adversary attacks are primarily resulting in spoofing data without modification or corruption to the data. In contrast to the passive adversary attacks, the active adversary attacks are much more malicious wherein the adversaries can persistently attempt to infiltrate a system, and/or to damage or destroy data already stored in the system. Herzberg et al. (1995) proposed the PSS scheme based on the Shamir SSS to address this problem. This method periodically renews the shares (without reconstructing the secret) so that it prevents an adversary from gaining the knowledge of the secret before it expires. To counter active adversary attacks, Herzberg et al. combined the ideas of the VSS technique to prevent dishonest participants (or compromised participants by active adversaries) from refusing to change the shares during the renew process, or introduce invalid secret shares. Marsh and Schneider (2004) developed an operational system -COrnell Data Exchange (CODEX). The system addressed the issue of dependability and proactive security of a secret sharing system in a distributed environment. Noticeably, all these schemes were based on the Shamir SSS. This paper presents a PSS method on the SSS on the matrix projection method (Bai, 2006) . The matrix projection method allows to share multiple secrets where the Shamir's technique permits only one secret to be shared. We have not seen anyone propose a different PSS method other than Herzberg's method on a multiple-secret sharing scheme in literatures. In lieu of this, our emphasis is on the passive attacks because we have not developed a suitable and efficient VSS scheme on the matrix projection secret sharing method for multiple secrets. This, however, does not mean that we cannot use Feldman's VSS to counter active adversary attacks. In this paper, we focused on developing a distributed PSS method to counter passive adversary attacks by using a renew matrix from the Pythagorean triples. We can still satisfy the properties of the PSS method:
• to update shares without reconstructing the secret
• to reveal the secret using any k updated shares
• to prevent the secret from being revealed by using k past and present shares.
To counter active adversary attacks like Herzberg's method, we need to implement similar VSS scheme like Feldman's method. However, it will be quite expensive because there are multiple secrets. In our future research, we will implement an effective VSS scheme before we can incorporate it with the proposed PSS scheme to counter active adversary attacks. The rest of the paper will be organised as follows. Section 2 presents the proactive secret sharing model and some assumptions. Section 3 briefly describes the Shamir's SSS, the matrix projection secret sharing method and Herzberg's PSS method. Our proposed PSS method is discussed in Sections 4 and 5 presents the conclusion.
Model and assumptions
According to the model and assumptions described in Herzberg et al. (1995) , we summarised them as follows:
1 The system consists of n servers 1 A = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } that will (proactively) share a secret s or a secret matrix S.
2 The system is securely and properly initialised.
3 All servers in A are connected to a common secure multicast medium C with the property that messages sent on C instantly reach every party connected to it and the property that an adversary cannot understand encrypted multicast messages even though the adversary can eavesdrop the multicast messages. It is worthy to mention that such a multicast channel is not difficult to implement since many mature secure group communication mechanisms have been developed (Zou et al., 2004) .
4 The system is synchronised with a common global clock. The time is divided into time periods which is determined by the common global clock. At the beginning of each time period, the servers engage an update protocol. Once the update is completed, the servers hold new shares of the secret or secret matrix.
5 Each server in A has its own local source of randomness.
6 Adversary is connected to the channel C, and the adversary knows the non-secret data and the algorithm that each server performs. However, the adversary cannot modify messages sent to C by a server which the adversary does not have control.
7 Adversary is computationally bounded where it cannot break the underlying cryptographic primitives used for secure communication.
8 Once the server is updated, all information is refreshed. In other words, the adversary cannot leave a backdoor to get back into the server again.
Here, to simplify our discussion of the proposed PSS technique, we consider the case of passive adversary attacks where the adversary cannot inject or modify messages multicast on the channel C. In other words, all servers in A are 'honest' servers and they can reliably trigger and participate in an updating process. We will investigate the counter method for the active adversary attacks in future research when we find more suitable and efficient VSS for the matrix project technique.
Secret Sharing Schemes and Herzberg's schemes
In this section, we briefly review two SSS • Shamir's method and its PSS scheme developed by Herzberg et al. (1995) • matrix projection method. Shamir (1979) developed the idea of a (k, n) threshold-based secret sharing technique (k ≤ n). The technique is to construct a polynomial function of order
Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
where the value d 0 is the secret and p is a prime number. The secret shares are the pairs of values (x i , y i ) where
The polynomial function f (x) is destroyed after each server P i possesses a pair of values (x i , y i ) so that no single server knows what the secret value d 0 is. In fact, no groups of (k − 1) or fewer secret shares can be used to discover the secret d 0 . On the other hand, when k or more secret shares are available, we can set up at least k equations y i = f (x i ) with k unknown parameters d i 's. The unique solution d 0 can be solved. Also, a Lagrange interpolation formula (Shamir, 1979) is commonly used to solve the secret value d 0 as the following formula
where (x i , y j ) are any k shares for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Shamir's SSS is regarded as a perfect SSS because knowing (k − 1) linear equations cannot expose any information about the secret.
Herzberg's Proactive Secret Sharing scheme
To periodically update shares is an effective way to protect a secret from being revealed by adversary attacks. Herzberg et al. (1995) developed a PSS technique for the Shamir's method. After the initialisation of Shamir's SSS, at the beginning of every time period, all 'honest' servers can trigger an update phase in which the servers perform a share renewal protocol. The shares computed in period t are denoted by using the superscript t, i.e., (
The algorithm is to construct a new (k − 1) random polynomial function at each updating phase as,
where
The Herzberg's share renew protocol for each server P i , i ∈ A, at the beginning of the time period t is as follows:
2 For all other servers P j , P i secretly sends
3 After decrypting u ji , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} P i computes its new share as
4 P i erases all the variables it used except of its current secret share y
Since the δ(x) function does not have a constant term, consequently, any group of k or more servers can still compute d 0 by contributing their new shares. However, a combination of k shares using past and present shares cannot be used to reconstruct the secret. As a result, the secret is protected from being revealed by the passive adversaries.
Secret Sharing Scheme using matrix projection
Bai (2006) developed a SSS using matrix projection method. Here, we describe briefly about some basic properties of matrix projection. Let A be an m × k matrix of rank k (m ≥ k > 0), and
where (•) is the transpose of a matrix. The m × m matrix S is the projection matrix of matrix A. We can also compute vectors v i using k linearly independent k × 1 vectors x i ,
The projection of matrix A is the same as the projection of matrix B. We can show that in the following theorem.
Proof:
To simplify notations, we write
The k × k matrix X is a full rank matrix because it has k linearly independent column vectors x i s. The equation (2) becomes
Substitute equation (3) into the projection of matrix B
B(B B)
Since the matrices X and X are invertible,
The result shows that
Denote projection matrix S = (s ij ) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, and it has following properties:
The invariance property of matrix projection can be used in secret sharing system to share multiple secrets. The detail of the scheme can be found in Bai (2006) . Bai proved that the matrix projection is a strong ramp SSS with k access levels.
Here, we present the procedure in two phases including a numerical example. The procedure is as follows:
• Construction of shares from a secret matrix S
5 Solve a remainder matrix R = (S − S) (mod p)
6 Destroy the matrix A, the vector x i s, the projection matrix S, the secret matrix S 7 Distribute n shares v i to servers in A and make the remainder matrix R publicly known.
• Secret reconstruction Choose n = 4 linearly independent vectors as
, and x 4 = 1 9 .
Next we compute v i = Ax i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, The reconstructed matrix is the same as the secret matrix, and the shares are 1/m of the size of the secret matrix (for our case, it is 1/5 because m = 5). This matrix projection method is not a perfect SSS, but it is a multiple-secret sharing scheme and has a strong protection on the secrets.
Proposed Proactive Secret Sharing scheme
In contrast, the matrix projection method cannot be updated easily by using the Herzberg's PSS technique. For n secret shares v i , we need to determine a different way to renew these vectors so that we can protect the secret. In this paper, we developed a different PSS technique by using the Pythagorean triples. Here, we review the Pythagorean triples (Weisstein, 2003) . The Pythagorean triples are the three integer values (Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 ) that satisfy the following equation:
The general form of a Pythagorean triples is
where a and b are positive integers (a > b). If we use the triples to construct a k × k matrix L = (l ij ) with two random index numbers g and h for 1 ≤ i, j, g, h ≤ k and g = h, we can have We can also verify that After we get the matrix L, we can construct another m × m orthonormal matrix T as,
It suggests that the matrix
where I m−k is an identity matrix with the dimension of (m − k) × (m − k). Similarly, T −1 = T . For example, a 5 × 5 matrix T can be constructed by using the matrix L matrix as,
for k = 2. Clearly, T T = I. If we denote v t i as a renewed secret share at time t from an old share v i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
the renewed shares can produce the same projection matrix S. We present a theorem as follows. = 1, 2, . . . , 
The renewed k shares v t i s can be used to construct a matrix B t as,
Since the matrix S is the projection matrix of V , we have
To determine the renewed projection matrix S t , we have
Apparently, a renewed projection matrix S t is related with the original projection matrix S. If we partition both matrices, we have
where matrices S 11 and S 
Proof: From Theorem 4.1, we know that S t = T ST , and the matrix T as
Hence,
To proactively share the projection matrix (or secret), we can see that we cannot share the whole projection matrix. Rather, we can only share the partitioned (m − k) × (m − k) matrix S 11 . Similar, we cannot share the original matrix S, but its partitioned matrix S 11 respectively.
An example for proactive matrix projection sharing
Consider the previous example shown in Section 3.3, we can only proactively share the secret matrix where the updating matrix T is shown in equation (7). The servers in A can compute the following new shares at time t,
If two shares (say 1 and 3) are combined to reconstruct the secret S 11 , we can form a matrix B t using shares v We can use the remainder matrix R to calculate
10 12 4 5 10 9 3 2 1
As a result, we renew the shares without reconstructing the secret (or the projection matrix), and we can still obtain the same secret matrix S 11 . When m is a larger number, the process becomes more efficient because the matrix S 11 has more elements to be shared. However, if a passive adversary has
• an older share v 1
• a renewed share v Consequently, the secret cannot be determined by simply obtaining a combination of k past shares and present shares. The secret matrix S 11 is protected after the shares are renewed. This process will ensure the adversaries cannot learn the projection matrix S when the shares are periodically renewed.
Periodic share renewal scheme using matrix projection technique
In the initialisation of SSS of an m × m secret matrix S (or essentially share the (m − k) × (m − k) secret matrix S 11 ), a centralised dealer can generate a projection matrix S to produce n pieces of shares v i ∈ Z m×1 store in n servers in A where we leave the remainder matrix R 11 to be publicly known (cannot be modified by anyone). After the initialisation, at the beginning of every time period, all honest servers trigger an update phase in which the servers perform a share renewal protocol. The shares computed in period t are denoted as v t i , t = 0, 1, . . . The share renew protocol for each server P i , i ∈ A, at the beginning of the time period t is as follows:
1 P i picks four nonzero random numbers:
2 P i multicasts g i , h i , a i and b i on the secure channel C so that all other P j can get these values.
3 After decrypting g j , h j , a j and b j , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} P i uses these values to generate a set of Pythagorean triples to produce an orthonormal matrix L j as shown in equations (5) and (6). Then, P i derives its new share as
where ( 
Correctness of the PSS scheme using matrix projection
It is easy to prove that our PSS scheme is correct. Because each server can obtain the same L = n j=1 L j matrix where L i s are orthonormal matrices for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we can show that L is also an orthonormal matrix because
Consequently, we can see that the server P i 's new shares
. for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. According to Theorems 4.1 and 4.1, the matrix S 11 remains the same after the updating process.
Secrecy of the PSS scheme using matrix projection
Using the similar argument as in Herzberg et al. (1995) , we can prove the security of the proposed scheme as follows. Let A be an adversary. Let K 1 be the set of k 1 servers whose shares in period (t − 1) (but not in period t) are compromised by A; let K 2 be the set of k 2 servers whose shares in both period (t − 1) and period t are compromised by A; let K 3 be the set of k 3 servers whose shares in period t (but not in period (t − 1)) are compromised by A. Since k is the threshold, we can assume k 1 + k 2 < k and k 2 + k 3 < k. Moreover, we will assume a clear worst case where
} k2 as sets of the shares in period (t − 1) corresponding to the servers in K 1 and K 2 , respectively; and V 2 = {v t i } k2 and V 3 = {v t i } k3 as sets of the shares in period t corresponding to the servers in K 2 and K 3 , respectively. We know that the shares in servers K 2 are related by an updating orthonormal matrix L as 
The matrix L cannot be determined uniquely because ( V 2 ) m−k2:m and (V 2 ) m−k2:m are k × (k 2 ) matrices and even in the worst case k 2 = k − 2 (and k 1 = k 3 = 1), they are not full rank matrices. A passive adversary A needs to recover the updating matrix T in order to reconstruct the correct projection matrix. Since the updating matrix T cannot be determined without the corrected L matrix, the adversary cannot get a renewed share of a server in K 1 or an old share of a server in K 3 . Consequently, the secret matrix will be protected from the passive attack. Also, the secret projection matrix S 11 is independent from how the matrix L is chosen. In other words, the above argument holds for any projection matrix S 11 , or no information of S 11 will be revealed to the adversary A.
Computation complexity of the PSS schemes
Also, we can compare the computation complexities of both PSS schemes. Herzberg's method requires to compute equation (1) n times for n different shareholders. There are n (k−1)k 2 multiplications. Consequently, the computation complexity of Herzberg's method is O(nk 2 ). In contrast, it appears that our method requires to multiple matrix T with n different v i s. However, a simple updating method is to compute the k × k matrix L with the last k elements in v i s. As a result, the number of multiplication is nk 2 for protecting (m − 2) 2 secrets. Per each secret, the computation complexity is O nk 2 (m−2) 2 . Clearly, our method has much less computation complexity compared to Herzberg's method.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new, secure and distributed PSS scheme for the matrix projection secret sharing method. We demonstrate a different PSS scheme other than Herzberg's method. The procedure is archived by constructing a renewal matrix L from the Pythagorean triples. After the shares are updated, any k shares of past and present shares cannot be used to reveal the secret matrix. Our method is emphasised on protection against the passive attacks. In future research, we are interested in developing methods to countermeasure active attacks by implementing an effective VSS before we incorporate it with our PSS scheme.
